By Michael Swaine, James Mulvenon, Kevin Pollpeter
The research provided during this document describes Taiwan's overseas and security rules and affects on them; assesses their implications for U.S. coverage.
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Additional info for Taiwan: Foreign and Defense Policymaking (2001)
135–138; Hickey, 1992, pp. 20–22; Hickey, 1997, pp. 116–125. 77Sutter, 1994, p. 18; Bush, 1994, p. 290. Y. Wang, “United States Arms Sales Policy Toward Taiwan: A Review of Two Decades of Implementation,” in Tai, 1999, pp. 122–129. 78Hickey, 1992, pp. 25–26, 28. ”79 Moreover, most of these states established relations with the ROC government to obtain lucrative economic benefits, and many of them have switched recognition back and forth between Taipei and Beijing in order to maximize such benefits.
66 At first, the ROC government resisted such pressure, citing the “One China” policy and strong support in the UN for the PRC position. As suggested above, many conservative KMT leaders were committed to a “zerosum” definition of “One China” and hence opposed any effort by the ROC to attempt to participate in the UN as either a “second China” or as a totally separate and independent state. However, in mid-1991, the Legislative Yuan (LY) approved a draft resolution stating that the government should seek to rejoin the UN at an appropriate time as the ROC, and over 60 percent of the public supported the bid for UN membership.
This understanding paved the way for the subsequent Singapore meeting by allowing both sides to set aside their differences over the political or sovereignty implications of “One China” and to focus instead on strengthening two-way cultural, trade, and economic exchanges. Wang and Koo thus signed four agreements on bilateral exchanges during their Singapore talks and established an institutionalized channel of communications for the settlement of disputes arising from cross-Strait activities.